Using a unique dataset of survey expectations, this paper examines the extent to which the classical fundamentalist -chartist dichotomy is valid for the foreign exchange market. By applying a recursive selection algorithm 1) respondents are classified into the two groups, and 2) the forecasting models are endogenously determined within the groups. We find that the largest part of the variation in expectations can be explained by the fundamentalist/chartist distinction. The majority of respondents use a simple chartist rule, while fundamentalists use a broad range of macro-economic information.
Introduction
A substantial body of literature in economics and finance models investors as heterogeneous and adaptive. The heterogeneity allows for interactions between traders behaving differently to impact the market. The heterogeneity can exist in a market at equilibrium or may keep the market out of equilibrium. The adaptation allows traders to select behavior appropriate for the perceived, possibly changing, market setting. The sensitivity of the market to the behavior of the traders can produce market destabilizing feedback loops. Models based on adaptive heterogeneous agents have offered insight explaining a variety of market phenomena that are difficult to capture with representative agent models. In financial markets, these include fat tails in returns, volatility clustering without auto-correlation in returns, bubbles, excess volatility, and slow mean reversion; see e.g. Lux (1998) , De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) .
Trader heterogeneity manifests in a variety of characteristics. A number of papers emerged to explore models of dynamic heterogeneity. Some models consider different levels of trader sophistication; famous example being Hommes (1997, 1998) . A sophisticated trader might employ rational expectations when forecasting the behavior of market prices while other traders employ a more naïve strategy. Alternatively, a model might explore the heterogeneity in information. A fundamental approach might engage in research in order to gain a private signal about future value while the market-based approach attempts to extract information from the price, as in De Grimaldi (2005, 2006) .
A theoretical foundation for sustainable market-based trading strategies (technical trading, charting) is rooted in Grossman and Stiglitz's seminal "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets" (1980) . Their paper established an equilibrium market condition in which market-based (uninformed) traders coexist with and depend on fundamentalist (informed) traders. In Grossman and Stiglitz, the uninformed traders are fully rational, but there presence in the market is based on their ability to extract information from the price.
Dynamics arise as traders switch between available information or levels of sophistication. The agents of the Brock and Hommes (1997) and Brock and Hommes (1998) consider the relative performance of different forecasting strategies. The models employ the random element in the discrete choice model of Manski and McFadden (1981) to create heterogeneity in the individual level choice among the available options. The environment highlights the inherent instability of markets.
The strategy that is in the minority performs better, but the superior performance attracts members of the population. Goldbaum (2005) introduces evolution in the strategies that are available to traders. The evolution reflects the effort by traders to improve the performance of inherently imperfect trading tools. A market populated by learning and adaptive traders has the potential of transitioning the market from one of price stability noisily reflecting the efficient market price, to a market in which the price is unstable and able to move away from the fundamental value.
While heterogeneous adaptive agents models provide intuitively appealing explanations for market phenomenon, do these explanations stand up empirically? If heterogeneity exists, is it dynamic and can the evolution be captured by a model of behavior? What dynamic model is most consistent with behavior? At present, there are two major classes of models, offering different behavior in the population. The parameters of these models, in particular the intensity of choice parameter, determine the existence, uniqueness, and stability of the market equilibrium. Estimating the parameters of these dynamic models can offer considerable insight into market behavior. Finally, are the strategies being employed by traders static, even as the proportion of the population employing them change, or are the strategies themselves also evolving? This paper contributes to the still emerging literature that empirically examines markets based on heterogeneous adaptive agent models. Only a handful of papers have sought to estimate these models and a number of issues remain unresolved or in need of empirical support. Included among these is Boswijk, Hommes, and Manzan (2007) . The investigation finds evidence of switching by traders between a trend following and mean reverting rule in the S&P500. Goldbaum and Mizrach (2008) model the distribution of new funds between active and passively managed mutual funds to estimate the intensity of choice model.
The success of the model in capturing the shift towards passively managed funds is evidence in favor of adaptive heterogeneity.
Evidence in favor of switching has also been found in experimental settings.
Experiments involving market entry decisions often find a wide range of strategies have been employed by the participants that still combined to bring the market to the equilibrium number of entrants. Hommes et al (2007) have their participants forecast an endogenously determined price that is influenced by their own forecast and the forecast of the other participants. The participants are rewarded for accuracy the accuracy of their forecasts. The authors identify four rule of thumb strategies employed by participants. Hommes and Anufriev (2007) extend the analysis by modeling the switching between strategies. Branch (2004) empirically tests an adaptive heterogeneous agent model based on survey respondents' reported inflation forecasts. Branch models the population as switching between three different models differentiated by there implicit level of sophistication. Again, evidence is found in support of a switching model where households respond to adopt the strategy that has performed well in the recent past. MacDonald and Marsh (1996) document, also on the basis of survey data, that market participants hold different beliefs on future price movements, and use different types of models to form expectations.
The current project also seeks to examine markets for evidence of adaptive heterogeneity and also to determine whether there is evidence in favor of learning in the foreign exchange market. De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) and De Grauwe and Markiewicz (2008) study heterogeneous agents and adaptation in foreign exchange markets and show that they are well capable of explaining the stylized facts. Similar to Branch, the current project seeks to model the reported forecast of survey participants. In this case, the data being employed is the exchange rate forecasts collected from participating international banks. Each period includes forecasts over a number of horizons for a number in individual institutions. Using the same data, Jongen et al. (2008) show that expectations are dispersed, and that panelists base expectations on fundamentalist/chartist types of considerations.
(For the following statement to be true, we would need to build a model where individual bank forecasts influence the market (maybe use Hommes et al). We could then run simulations based on the model to find out what extreme behaviors/events might arise in the market. This should be part of the project.) Sounds very cool, but I guess we should be careful not to go too far from the empirical model if we want this to make any sense.
The evaluation offers the possibility of explaining market crashes as they result from disequilibrium produced by competitive profit seeking in an environment of imperfect information, learning and adaptation.
Model
Each of N traders in a market maximize an expected negative exponential utility function in next period's wealth, Consider a market in which the population of traders is informed by two models of exchange rate determination. The fundamental approach presumes that the market is driven by fundamentals. This may include notions of purchasing power parity (PPP) or interest rate parity (IPP), among other fundamental determinants. A trader relying on fundamentals trades in the currency market seeking to take advantage of exchange rate deviations from the fundamentals. A chartist approach employs past exchange rate innovations as a predictor for future innovations. The chartist trades according to the predictions of the chartist approach.
Fundamental model
There is a fundamental exchange rate, 
Here, ψ captures the rate at which the market reverts towards fundamentals.
In a similar environment, DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) 
the second term on the right hand side is present to take advantage of the overlap in the prediction period from the forecast made in period 1 t − and the current period t forecast. The third term controls for information in 
Chartist information
Chartist information is composed on past market information, namely previous innovations in the exchange rate. Let c t Z represent the vector of time t chartist information. The chartist forecast is captured by the following process:
Individual forecasts are captured by
thereby capturing the same sources of heterogeneity that exists among the fundamentalists.
Discrete choice
Equations (5) and (7) capturing the forecasts of individuals will be examined in a variety of settings. Included is an environment that allows each individual trader to choose which strategy to employ for each given period. (The following is not present in the current version of the paper, but will be examined: Each trader chooses according to a fitness function as though solving a Manski and McFadden style discrete choice problem. As introduced by Brock and Hommes (1997) , the traders use past performance as an indicator of future fitness.)
In the empirical examination, a forecast is labeled as either a fundamentally derived forecast or a chartist forecast based on its relative proximity to systematic component of (5) 
and
represent the systematic components of each model. Thus,
(
where
Continuous choice
Another environment examined is one in which the trades are allowed to combine the two strategies in order to create a single estimate. In this case, the estimate is a weighted average of the systematic components of (5) and (7). Let , i t w indicate the weight trader i places on the fundamental strategy. As a result,
The weight is, again, is based on the relative distance of the individual's forecast from the fitted model.
(1 exp( ))
which results in , [0, 1] i t w ∈ .
Data
To investigate the behavioral aspects of the forecasts of market participants, we use a unique database of survey-based exchange rate forecasts. The individual forecasts are The names of the panelist companies are revealed.
Although survey participants have a few days time to return their forecasts, we learned that the vast majority send their responses by e-mail on the Friday before the publication day, which is typically the second Monday of the month. We consider this
Friday to be the day on which the forecasts are formed and assume that the beliefs are translated one-to-one in a point forecast. To verify that the information sets of market participants are not too diverse, all of the analyses throughout this study were reestimated using spot data from various days surrounding this Friday, yet the overall results remain virtually unchanged.
There may be reasons for panelists not to reveal their true beliefs, though. One motive may be that agents do not want to expose their (private) information to other market participants. This effect may be mitigated by the reputation effect that this survey can have. When the names of the forecasters are given in the survey publication (as is the case with our data), agents have an incentive to perform well in order to attract customers.
All remaining data, i.e. spot rates and macro-economic data are obtained through 
Methodology
Unique to the current examination (to our knowledge) is the fact that different models under consideration are endogenous to the traders employing them. Branch (2004) for example, considers three exogenous models of inflation. His naïve expectation model has 1 e t t + π = π . The two more sophisticated models are a model of adaptive expectations and a VAR. In both cases, the parameters of the model are chosen to fit the data, so that the model is optimized to minimize the error of the forecast of inflation, rather than to capture the model employed by the forecaster.
Our objective is to have those traders employing the model indicate the parameters of the model. This is accomplished by choosing the parameters to minimize the mean squared error of the forecast by those traders who employ the forecast. This involves some degree of simultaneity as the estimation of the model depends on how the individuals are sorted and the sorting depends on the model. Our solution is to estimate, sort and then re-estimate over a number of iterations until the sorting and the model parameters settle. Similarly, in the continuous choice model, the weights and the model parameters are interdependent. As in the discrete choice setup, weights and coefficients are determined through a number of iterations.
Experimentation with different starting points does suggest that there is some path dependence in the estimation procedure, but not enough to change the implication for the model. Formally, the estimation procedure for the discrete choice model is as follows:
The model is estimated in a system of two equations, one equation per group, using simple OLS. The initial distribution of agents over groups (or initial determination of weights) is done by estimating the two expectation formation models individually per respondent. Based on best fit, each respondent is subsequently classified as either fundamentalist or chartist. There exists a certain path dependency conditional on the initial distribution of agents. We feel, however, that this procedure yields the best results in that the fit is maximized and the initial distribution is credible as it is based on individual estimates. Next, the two rules are estimated in the system, in a pooled setup, using the initial distribution of respondents. The distribution of respondents across groups is subsequently updated based on the new estimation results, and the system is again estimated. This procedure is repeated until convergence, i.e. until respondents do not change groups anymore and coefficient estimates of the rules are constant. Generally this occurs within ten iterations, conditional on the complexity of the model. As such, the classification of agents and the actual expectation formation rules are being learned endogenously in the iteration process.
Results
A benchmark version of the model is estimated without weights or division of respondents. Both rules are estimated for the full sample of respondents and time. The results are presented in Table 2 . < Insert Table 2 Here > The estimation results in Table 2 generally indicate that both fundamentalist and chartist information sources are being used significantly in forming survey expectations. For the 3-months horizon, we observe that different fundamental information is used for different currencies; furthermore, information is also used differently given the different signs. In general though, the interest rate and growth differentials appear to be most influential. The sign of the growth differential in Japan, positive, is counterintuitive; this might be due to the a-typical growth pattern in Japan during the sample, i.e., negative growth. The chartist coefficient β is negative and highly significant for all countries; this implies that panellists expect a strong mean reversion. The lagged and the 1-month expectations, finally, are both highly significant and carry the expected signs. This implies that panellists are depending heavily on last period's expectation due to the fact that the sampling frequency is higher than the forecasting horizon. Also, expectations are being updated consistently with regards to the 1-month expectation. For both the fundamentalists and the chartists the model is able to capture a considerable amount of variation in the expectations; especially so for the Yen and the Euro. The fit for the UK Pound is less due to the lower sampling frequency.
For the 12-months horizon we observe that fundamental information is more important. Both the effect sizes and the significance have increased compared to the short horizon. The fit is also significantly better, but this might also be due to the fact that the auto-correlation becomes stronger as a result of the 11 months overlap between consecutive observations. Also the chartist rule is stronger. This increase in effect sizes in both rules is a result of the fact that the forecasting horizon is longer, and therefore that the expected variance in the exchange rate is larger. Table 3 presents the results of the model with static discrete weights.
Discrete choice estimation
Panellists are classified as either fundamentalist or chartist for the entire period covered by the survey. The modified model being estimated is , , , 
(1 ) ( Table 3 Here > In terms of significant fundamental information, we observe a number of changes relative to the benchmark model for the short horizon. The interest rate loses its significance for the Euro and the Pound, while the growth rate and the balance of payments gain significance. The 1-month expectation also loses significance for the Yen. In general, though, the fit of the fundamentalist rule decreases. The results for the chartist rule are opposite; both effect sizes and significance levels increase across the board, and the fit improves as well.
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For the long horizon, results are comparable. There are some shifts in the significance levels of fundamental variables; the interest rate effect though, keeps its significance and even improves for the Yen. Also for the balance of payments there are large improvements for all currencies compared to the benchmark model. The fit for the long horizon fundamental rule increases for all currencies. The changes for the chartist rule are consistent; increase in effect sizes, significance levels, and model fit.
The percentage of fundamentalists in the survey ranges from 13 to 55 percent.
In other words, the majority of panellists use a chartist rule. Also, the fraction of fundamentalists is lower at the long horizon compared to the short horizon.
< Insert Table 4 Here > Table 4 reports the results of estimating the original model captured by (10) and (11) in which panellists update their forecasting strategy each period. Hence, instead of considering the average distance between the rule and the expectation, as in (11), the selection procedure is applied per period.
The flexibility substantially improves the fit of the model. For inflation, growth, and the balance of payments, we find significant results for at least two currencies, three for growth. The effect sizes of the auto-regressive terms,
decrease. The effect on the model fit differs per currency. For the chartist rule we again observe an increase in effect sizes and significance levels; the model fit increases dramatically for all three currencies.
The results for the long horizon are virtually identical compared to Table 3 in terms of significance. Striking is the fact that the signs of the fundamental variables change. Effect sizes and levels of significance again increase for the chartist rule. Fit of the fundamental rule differs per currency while the fit of the chartist rule increases considerably for all three currencies.
The percentage of panellist using the fundamental rule is generally larger than in the static case, but still smaller than fifty percent. Fundamentalism is still less common for the long than the short horizon. The autocorrelation in the chosen rule is low. This means that strategies are chosen each period, independent of the choice in the previous period. Table 5 Here > 
Continuous choice estimation
< Insert
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As in the discrete choice version, the two models are estimated independently based
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The estimation results are highly comparable to those of the benchmark model in Table 2 . Only marginal changes in coefficients and standard errors can be observed.
As such, the fit is also similar, and thus smaller than that of the static discrete case in Table 3 .
The cross-sectional descriptive statistics of the weights indicate that on average more panellists lean more towards chartism than fundamentalism. The proportion lies roughly in the range between 0.40 and 0.55; there is not much variation between individuals, given the relatively low standard deviation.
< Insert Table 6 Here > Table 6 Table   4 .
The aggregation of the weights is consistent with what generated from the fixed weight model. The average weight is somewhat below 50%, and the range is limited to 0.27 to 0.73. The autocorrelation in weights is always negative, but low.
One can draw a number of conclusions from the estimation results in Tables 2   through 6 . First of all, both the fundamentalist and the chartist forecasting rule are being used by the respondents in the survey. For the fundamentalist rule, especially relative economic growth 3 α is influential in the short horizon, and both the interest rate differential 1 α and relative economic growth 3 α for the long horizon. The fit of the fundamental rules and the changing significance of variables indicates that the used variables are relevant, but that there is no consensus amongst panellist on "the" fundamental exchange rate. Also, the auto-correlation in expectations is not so large that it drives a large part of the results, as it partly does for the chartists. Therefore, fundamentalists apparently use a more sophisticated forecasting model.
The chartist rule is significant in models for all currencies. Also, it consistently takes the form of a contrarian strategy; in other words, panellists expect a reversion of the most recent change in the exchange rate. The chartist rule shows a very large fit; in other words, chartists use a very simple forecasting rule based on their past expectation combined with the most recent change in the exchange rate.
The fundamentalist-chartist dichotomy often put forward in the literature is therefore a very relevant classification, consistent with the findings of, among others, Taylor (1990, 1992) , and Jongen et al. (2008) .
Another interesting finding is that panellists lean heavily on their previous period's expectation: 0 1 > γ . This makes sense as the period over which the expectation is formed coincides for two (eleven) periods with previous period's expectation for the short (long) horizon. Also, panellists' expectations are consistently updated relative to previous period's expectation by subtracting the 1-month expectation of period t-1;
The flexibility of agents to change strategy is of great importance. For both the discrete and the continuous case, there is a substantial improvement in the fit after introducing switching. This is direct evidence in favour of the heterogeneous agents models with switching, as introduced in Hommes (1997, 1998) . Another important finding in this respect is the fact that panellists appear to use one single strategy instead of a combination of strategies. Panellists are either fundamentalist or chartist. This shows from the better fit of the model with discrete weights (Table 4) than the model with continuous weights (Table 6) . A final important finding here is that chartism is dominant. More than half of the panellists are classified as being chartist. Again, this is consistent with Allen and Taylor (1992) , who state that 90% of market participants use some sort of technical analysis.
In order to gain somewhat more insights into the workings of the model, Table   7 presents the correlations between the different classifications and weights of the estimated models. Table 7 Here > The highest correlations can be found in the cells combining static with static, and combining dynamic with dynamic. In other words, the models produce consistent behaviour. Figure 1 illustrates the two forecasting rules together with the expectations of one of the panellists; it concerns results from the dynamic discrete model. Figure 1 Here > The figure illustrates a number of interesting issues. Firstly, the chartist rule follows the actual expectations relatively close. The fundamentalist rule, on the other hand, is more detached and does not follow the actual expectations. This is a confirmation of the estimation results of the γ parameters. Clearly as well is the fact that chartists are destabilizing, while fundamentalists are stabilizing. This shows from the high volatility in the chartist rule compared to the low volatility in the fundamentalist rule.
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Conclusion
A model has been developed to examine the behaviour of banks when forming forecasts of future exchange rate innovations over a variety of time horizons. The model allows for market participants to switch between different strategies for forming expectations. Two model based on two strategies is developed. The two strategies examined are a fundamental strategy by which predictions concerning future exchange rates are based on exchange rate fundamentals, and a chartist strategy by which market based information serves as a predictor of future exchange rates.
The empirical analysis suggests that the switching model is useful for explaining the heterogeneity in the forecasts of the different banking institutions that took part in the survey. Allowing the banks to switch strategies during the sample period improved the fit of the model. It also provides an attractive narrative of market behaviour that is consistent with stylized facts. The forecasts produced by the fundamental model are fairly stable, tending to produce predictions of only small innovations in the exchange rate. Predictions of larger innovations are better captured by the chartist model. Allen and Taylor (1990) document the use of chartist techniques among foreign exchange traders. Individual traders explain that it is not necessarily that they believe that charting captures fundamentals, but that the market can be driven by chartists since they are so plentiful in the foreign exchange markets. For this reason, it is important to include chartist tools when considering trades. Presumably, the same is true when forming predictions. The fact that bank forecasts appear to be driven, at times, by a chartist models may be a reflection of the fact that bank believe that the market based information is informative about market innovations away from fundamentals. The results could also be considered supportive of the notion that market based information is useful for predicting fundamental innovations supported by private information not available to the modeller. The latter interpretation is consistent with Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and other papers that argue in favour of the use of chartists techniques to extract information from the market.
The results raise a number of issues that remain to be examined. Preliminary examination of the switching behaviour, for example, seems to suggest that there is little predictability at the individual bank level. It does not, for example, appear to be tied to past performance, as would be consistent with the body of literature developed based on the work of Brock and Hommes (1997) . Further investigation is clearly
warranted. The present model of behaviour by the exchange rate traders does not include a model of switching, but one should be developed. Table presents estimation results for the model with static discrete weights. R 2 is adjusted R 2 ; standard errors in parenthesis; % fun is the percentage of panellists using the fundamentalist rule. 
